Gender Neutrality under Section 354, IPC
The
question for consideration herein is that whether a woman can be an
accused under Section 354, IPC?
“354.
Assault or criminal force to woman with intent to outrage her
modesty.—Whoever
assaults
or uses criminal force to any woman, intending to outrage or knowing
it to be likely that he
will thereby outrage her modesty,
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to two years, or with fine, or with both.”
(emphasis supplied)
Whether
the word “he” in Sec. 354, IPC has to be interpreted so as to
include male(s) as well as female(s)?
For
the answer to this question, we may refer to the following
provisions:
Section
8 of IPC: The pronoun “he” and its derivatives are used of any
person, whether male or female.
In
the case of Girdhar Gopal v. State1
it is held that:-
The
pronoun “he” in the expression “or knowingly it to be likely
that he will thereby outrage her modesty” in Section 354 must be
understood, according to the present section, as referring to “any
person, whether male or female”.
Section
13 of the General Clauses Act, 1897- Gender and number: In
all Central Acts and Regulations, unless there is anything repugnant
in the subject or context-
- Words importing the masculine gender shall be taken to include females; and
- Words in the singular shall include the plural, and vice-versa.
In
accordance with the rule that words importing masculine gender are to
be taken to include females, the word ‘men’ may be properly held
to include women2,
and the pronoun ‘he’ and its derivatives may be construed to
refer to any person whether male or female.3
So the words ‘his father and mother’ as they occur in Section
125(1)(d) of the Cr. P.C. have been construed to include ‘her
father and mother’ and a daughter has been held liable to maintain
her father unable to maintain himself.4
Person
may include a natural person, may be “Male” or “Female”. But
where legislature specifically intends to refer male human being, it
may use man & woman. Taking into view these definitions and
explanations in the IPC, when Sec. 125 of Cr. P.C. use the word
person it has to be taken to include both “Male” and “Female”.
It means that if any “Male” or “Female” having sufficient
means neglect or refuses to accept “his” or “her” liability
to maintain then if any other conditions of Sec. 125, Cr. P.C. are
show to exist, liability may be fastened to maintain.5
Hence,
the intention of the legislature under Sec. 354 is to accuse not only
a male but also a female. The same is evident by the use of the word
“Whoever”
u/S 354 as against the use of the terminology “a man
is said to commit rape” u/s 3756.
The
intention of the legislature is crystal clear wherein it depicts that
under Section 354 the offence of outraging the modesty of a woman can
be committed by any person whether male or female. As far as the
offence of rape is concerned, only a male can be booked as an accused
owing to the language of the Section 375.
For
Section 3767,
where the term “whoever” is used, it can be said that the ambit
of the term “whoever” is restricted by the term “rape” which
can only be committed by a man. Therefore, under Section 376, only a
man can be convicted.
Whereas
for an offence u/s 376D8,
woman can also be made an accused for gang rape as the provision
entails the term “persons” which can include man as well as
woman. This can be said that the offence of gang rape is an
altogether different class of offence. (e.g. The elements of the
offence of Robbery and Dacoity have nearly the same. The difference
in the number of persons committing the offence makes the two, two
different offences.)
Further,
where no express provision lies for the punishment of the abetted
act, then the quantum of punishment for such act shall be equal
to the punishment of the abetted act.9
Therefore,
in the ultimate analysis, the intention of the legislature does not
seem to absolve any person, male or female for their involvement or
assistance in the commission of the offence punishable under section
354.
4
Vijaya Manohar Abrat (Dr.) (Mrs.) v. Kashiram Rajaram Sawai, (1987)
2 SCC 278, p. 281 : AIR 1987 SC 1100.
6
“[375. Rape.—A
man is said
to commit “rape” who, except in the case hereinafter excepted,
has sexual intercourse with a woman under circumstances falling
under any of the six following descriptions:—………”
7
“376.
Punishment for rape- 1. Whoever, except in the cases provided
for in sub-section (2), commits rape, shall be punished with
rigorous imprisonment of either description for a term which shall
not he less than seven years, but which may extend to imprisonment
for life, and shall also be liable to fine.”
8
“Gang
rape. 376D. Where a woman is raped by one
or more persons constituting a group or
acting in furtherance of a common intention, each of those persons
shall be deemed to have committed the offence of rape and shall be
punished with rigorous imprisonment for a term which shall not be
less than twenty years, but which may extend to life which shall
mean imprisonment for the remainder of that person's natural life,
and with fine:Provided that such fine shall be just and reasonable
to meet the medical expenses and rehabilitation of the victim:
Provided
further that any fine imposed under this section shall be paid to
the victim”
9
“109.
Punishment of abetment if the act abetted is committed in
consequence and where no express provision is made for its
punishment.—Whoever abets any offence shall, if the act abetted is
committed in consequence of the abetment, and no express provision
is made by this Code for the punishment of such abetment, be
punished with the punishment provided for the offence.
Explanation.—An act or offence is said to be committed in
consequence of abetment, when it is committed in consequence of
the instigation, or in pursuance of the conspiracy, or with the aid
which constitutes the abetment.”
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